ten countries of origin including Turkey, Poland, Russia, the US, and the states of the former Yugoslavian territory. The remaining 50 per cent of migrants came from over 100 different countries (BAMF 2005, p. 121) . As to the composition of the migrant population, the proportion of newer, smaller groups in relation to older, larger groups of migrants has grown. The changes in the northern German city of Hamburg between 2003 and 2006 are representative of many large German and European cities. In particular, the share of the population of Turkish descent is declining whereas the share of migrants from Poland is on the increase and, most interestingly, some groups that were hitherto not particularly strongly represented, such as migrants from Ukraine, the Philippines, Togo, Vietnam and India, have shown particularly large growth within just a few years (Statistikamt Nord 2007) . Similar tendencies, often even more pronounced, apply to other European cities such as London, Lisbon, Barcelona, Milan, Amsterdam and Copenhagen (Alexander 2004, p. 60) . The general population structure has also become more heterogeneous through migration. From a historical perspective, current developments represent a reverse of the trend towards cultural homogenization that took place from the First World War until the early 1950s. As to the demographic effects, taking Spain Á a country of just over 46 million people Á the population of immigrant origin has soared from around half a million in 1996 to over 5 million; that is, from less than 1 per cent to 11 per cent in about ten years. Linguistic and religious differentiation patterns now tend to overlap in Western European cities, at least at both ends of the societal hierarchy (Kraus 2008) . This 'new medievalism' can be seen as an expression of a partial, successive disaggregation of territory, political control, and cultural practices. Lately, astute observers have labelled the accumulation of these phenomena regarding migration channels, countries of origin, linguistic heterogeneity, religious diversity, and policy responses as 'super-diversity' (Vertovec 2007) .
Not surprisingly, growing diversity has been taken up in manifold public and academic contexts. For example, visible signs of difference have been connected to gender equality, and allegedly failed efforts to incorporate migrants, as debates on the headscarf in virtually all European countries show. While such incidents have attracted a great deal of media attention, the politicization and frequently undue dramatization of such issues disguise the fact that a substantive transformation is currently taking place. Behind the talk of diversity in relation to incorporation is, or at least is claimed to be, the understanding that organizations of the majority society should not discriminate against their staff, their members, or their clientele on the grounds of cultural characteristics, but rather should be sensitive and responsive to these characteristics. From this perspective certain cultural skills such as languages and social contacts are to be regarded as personal competences and selling points, useful, for example, in the diversity management of multinational businesses or even mid-sized companies engaged in globalized markets. Hospitals can serve as an example from the public sector: in many inner-city hospitals across Western Europe between 20 and 40 per cent of patients are migrants or the children of migrants (Healy and McKee 2004) . Above all, some organizations are adjusting their practices and routines, for instance with respect to staff recruitment and interpreting services. In short, policies and organizational routines have already begun to move beyond the issue of the adaptation of individual migrants (assimilation) to the level of organizations in which life-chances regarding health, education, and work are distributed and regulated.
These changes raise the question of whether diversity is a new mode or paradigm different from assimilation and multiculturalism. I argue that diversity as a concept and a set of Á not necessarily coherent Á policies, programmes and routines straddles many worlds: it appeals to those who emphasize individual economic competence and selfreliance of migrants ('neo-liberals'), to those who cherish the public competence of immigrants in public affairs (republicans), as well as to those, like the European Commission, who push for structural reforms to turn incorporation into a two-way process (Commission of the European Communities 2003). In particular, the adaptation of organizations to 'cultural' factors, the economic use of 'soft' skills, and service delivery to a culturally heterogeneous clientele come to the forefront. While assimilation focuses on individual migrants passing into mainstream society, and multiculturalism, in some varieties, emphasizes the rights of migrants as a means to increase their sense of recognition and belonging and also overall national unity, diversity approaches can be seen as concentrating on the level in between Á on organizations. In the context of migration we can even observe the emergence of new forms of diversity, namely transnationality, as a way of life. Nonetheless, while the focus on the intermediate level of organizations may be an important addition in that it is linked to the 'civil sphere' of incorporation (Alexander 2006) , the problem is that a rights-based foundation is missing. Therefore, one of the greatest challenges of diversity Á social inequality Á goes unchallenged. Beyond the organizational realm and that of economic efficiency, diversity needs to be grounded in both civil society, as a set of socio-moral resources of citizenship, and citizenship rights in order to become a politically legitimate approach. Otherwise diversity will remain a depoliticized management technique.
The following analysis first traces the many meanings of the term 'diversity' which explain part of its appeal. Second, the account moves to more clearly carve out diversity as a political concept in comparing it to two other broad paradigms of migrant incorporation, namely assimilation and multiculturalism. Both the semantic and conceptual parts serve, third, to understand the constitution of diversity through diverse sets of policies, programmes, and routines, both internal to national states, and externally by focusing on the new enthusiasm around migrants as development agents. Fourth, policy responses to diversity have been accelerated by the transnationalization of the life worlds of migrants as well as relatively immobile persons and by the universalization of individual rights, which provide opportunities for migrants to maintain multiple ties to various states. The account concludes with the main challenge ahead, namely to connect diversity as a management technique with an approach taking into account democratic contestation.
The multiple layers of diversity
Definitions of diversity are seldom enlightening: 'Diversity refers to any mixture of items characterized by differences and similarities' (Thomas 1996, p. 5). We know from Ludwig Wittgenstein that the meaning of a term can be inferred from the way it is used. Diversity is currently in vogue in many public debates and academic disciplines ranging from cultural anthropology to micro-economics and biogenetics, as in 'biodiversity'. In the socio-political and economic realms it can be found Á to present an incomplete list Á in the context of ethnicity, culture, gender mainstreaming, age, class, sexual orientation, religion, professional function, educational background, mental and physical capabilities, and health (e.g. Wood 2003 ). In the context of migration it is often used to refer to a plurality of languages, religions, and ethnic groups.
A preliminary analysis of the term 'diversity' brings forth three meanings pertaining to three different societal levels. The first meaning refers to diversity as a characteristic of societies. 'Diverse societies' is a term often used self-descriptively and synonymously with multicultural societies such as Canada. More particularly, it relates to the deconstruction of notions of normality and dominant cultures as well as perceived inclusion through recognition (Fraser and Honneth 2003) . Often, on this first level, diversity is a synonym for cultural pluralism to be accommodated by multicultural policies. At the next level, and this is the one that dominates, diversity concerns organizations. This includes the observation that organizations of the mainstream society adapt their practices and routines to take cultural heterogeneity into consideration. Finally, at the individual level, diversity refers to the intercultural competences of a person in forms such as multilingualism. A connection between the latter two dimensions ensues when organizations Á in particular, commercial organizations or public services Á attempt to enhance their efficiency by recruiting staff on the basis of such competences as part of 'managing diversity'. Semantically there is an interesting similarity with multiculturalism. In its typical articulation, it is generally presented in a fashion that manages to blend or blur its utility as an analytic concept with its expression as a normative precept, similar to multiculturalism (cf. Wieviorka 1998).
Modes of incorporation: assimilation, multiculturalism, diversity
Does the reinterpretation and linguistic shift in the meaning of diversity at all three levels also indicate a paradigm shift from assimilation and multiculturalism to diversity? Assimilation as a final result of incorporation processes is often based on the assumption of different integrative stages; for instance, cognitive relating to the norms of the immigration society, structural relating to education and employment, and civil-societal relating to participation of immigrants in all spheres of life. However the social integration of migrants is conceptualized, whether as a sequence of steps or as an array of simultaneous processes, one objective or prediction is the gradual disappearance of cultural markers as a distinguishing social criterion for the exploitation of chances in life in immigration societies over, say, two or three generations. Assimilation, or at least older notions of assimilation from the 1920s until the 1960s, emphasizes the way in which migrants orient themselves to certain roles and the accompanying behavioural expectations related to those roles that the majority society holds of migrants (Gordon 1964) . A diversity perspective, by contrast, takes the already existing skills and experiences of migrants as the starting point and interprets them as competences to be used by organizations. It thus assumes that the institutions of the majority society must also adapt and accommodate for migrant experiences, implicitly referring to the need for mutual adjustment, albeit in an asymmetric way. More recent assimilation theories, such as 'new assimilationism', no longer assume that there is a societal core to which migrants orient themselves unquestioningly (Alba and Nee 2003) .
In the mode of incorporation which can be loosely called multiculturalism, the emphasis does lie on the recognition of cultural differences, allowing immigrants full participation in national societies as cultural minorities. Such policies include enabling measures for individuals belonging to minorities with a long history of subjection to discrimination, affirmative action measures in education and employment, as well as collective measures such as quota representation of migrants in political parties or state subsidization of institutions such as schools or hospitals run by ethnic groups.
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Whether as official state policies or as implicit approaches to cultural and in particular ethnic pluralism, multiculturalism in practice has meant that such a mode of incorporation would serve the interests of the state in promoting national unity. In this way Canada and Australia were the first to implement multicultural policies. In Canada, multiculturalism in practice has meant that ethnic groups are permitted to maintain aspects of their ancestral heritage, and that at times the state has played an interventionist role in protecting ethnic group claims, especially regarding the French-speaking minority and aboriginal people. Patterning their legislation after the Canadian model, Australia became the second country to establish an official multicultural policy with two key elements. First, based on the assumption that multiculturalism necessitated a reduction in racism, the government assumed a more proactive role in the protection of the rights of individual minority members than it had in the past. Second, multiculturalism viewed the core of Australian national identity as embedded in the notion of diversity. This implied that national identity was not to be construed as fixed in the past, but rather as fluid and future-oriented. Multiculturalism in Australia did not promote minority group rights, but rather articulated, at the level of the individual, rights and obligations (Castles 1997, p. 15) .
In the United States, multiculturalism Á though not used in official public policy Á took its substantive form in policies that came to constitute 'the minority rights revolution'. A distinctive feature of these efforts was that they 'targeted groups of Americans understood as disadvantaged but not defined by socioeconomic class' (Skrentny 2002, p. 4). Two particular policies stand out as being of singular importance: affirmative action and bilingual education. At least in terms of their design these policies resemble those enacted in Australia insofar as the focus is on individual members of disadvantaged groups and not the groups themselves.
In the United Kingdom highly restrictive immigration policies were enacted to stem the flow of new arrivals. At the same time there was a concerted effort, grounded in the Race Relations Act and administratively promoted by the Commission for Racial Inequality and Race Relations Councils, to reduce racism and intergroup tensions (Solomos 2003) . None of this was viewed explicitly in terms of advancing a multicultural agenda, but as in the US, Britain increasingly exhibited a multicultural sensibility. Similar to the Canadian case, the advocates of multiculturalism thought it possible and desirable to promote and sustain diversity while forging a shared sense of what it means to be British (Modood 2005, p. 171 ).
Yet multiculturalism as a concept and as a set of practices has also generated intense ideological debates. Some critics contend that the multicultural moment is over as state policy and social practice (Barry 2001; Joppke 2004) . It is important to take a glance at these criticisms because they give clues to the success of the diversity agenda. Group rights are particularly controversial, although they are hardly ever conceded to migrant groups. For example, in the Netherlands, whereas multiculturalism as 'ethnic minorities policy' in the 1980s and early 1990s aimed above all to incorporate immigrants into the Dutch welfare state by strengthening equal individual rights and supporting migrant associations, public debate in the 1990s focused on one aspect only Á alleged group rights (Entzinger 2003) . This was part of a shift in public policy to emphasize the 'good' immigrant citizen as one who is economically self-reliant and adapts quickly to Dutch values and language.
More generally, critics of multicultural policies often remark that the emphasis on individual and collective characteristics in people subject to discrimination accentuates the very features on which their exclusion is based. The result is that, rather than being overcome, exclusion is then perpetuated by the minorities themselves through their representation and mobilization Á to say nothing of the danger of backlash or populist counter-reactions. What follows is a politics of resentment between different groups, and the institutional differentiation of identities hampers the development of an overarching trust. This means that multiculturalism is divisive and as such threatens national unity (Schlesinger 1992). For others, the differentialist focus of multiculturalism results in the erosion of the possibility of progressive alliances and coalitions (Gitlin 1995) and helps to place a politics of redistribution on the back burner (see Banting und Kymlicka 2004 for a rejoinder to such arguments).
Diversity as a potential mode of incorporation circumvents such criticisms, first, in not emphasizing the rights of migrants or nationalcultural minorities but the 'positive' effects of cultural plurality and competence for private companies and public service delivery. Correspondingly, there is a semantic shift from the recognition of collective identities to that of individual competences. This facilitates a connection both to the individualization discourse and to notions of individual entrepreneurial spirit. Second, the diversity discourse is not simply focused on migrants, who are just one of many categories to be considered. This helps to connect multiple programmes, such as 'gender mainstreaming' and 'diversity management'. Moreover, cultural difference is only one characteristic: others include gender or sexual orientation. In sum, from a semantic point of view, the change regards not so much the modes of incorporation as such but the emphasis taken. Therefore, the evidence should not simply be read as the supplanting of earlier concepts such as assimilation and multiculturalism with that of diversity. One could rather speak of a continuing vibrancy of multicultural sensitivities. Yet in order to avoid obvious criticisms, some of the debate and practices have shifted from a rights-based to a competence-based agenda.
A caveat is in order. There is no unilinear, uncontested, or clear trend towards a diversity-based mode of incorporation. Not only are modes of incorporation in flux, but there are always counteracting tendencies. For example, there is a flurry of neo-assimilationist thought in academia (e.g. Brubaker 2001) and in public discourses. Nevertheless, diversity-type arguments have found affinities in citizenship and incorporation debates. Take, for example, integration and citizenship courses, which are in some European states mandatory for acquiring citizenship, such as in Denmark and the Netherlands. Such countries have adopted civics courses and national citizenship tests for migrants, and such initiatives have spread quickly throughout Europe over the past few years. In essence, good citizens are now not only those who support themselves economically and have no criminal record, but they must also prove that they speak the national language (Spencer and di Mattia 2004). The newest aspect of this development is the widespread discussion in public policy circles of the idea of 'earned citizenship', the precursors of which can be found in the Canadian citizenship regime. Here the acquisition of citizenship is made contingent on voluntary work and appropriate social behaviour.
The constitution of diversity
Diversity is not a pre-social category but always loaded with attributed meanings. It is the perceived, evaluated form of (cultural) difference. It is thus constructed by societal agents by drawing demarcation lines between classifications with social meanings and sometimes defining certain classifications as the dominant ones. In all the observations made so far, diversity has appeared to be mainly a characteristic with positive connotations for economic efficiency, social trust, and the common good. Yet one should not forget that its many meanings give ample room for divergent interpretations. For example, in political debates and academic analyses, evidence of increasing heterogeneity is often associated with fears of domination by 'foreign' influences. In the United States, the argument is widely discussed that the disuniting of nations follows: in terms of the ethnic composition of the US, the consequence of the current migratory wave has been that the 'Latino' populations have grown significantly. This has alarmed contemporary nativists, seeing diversity as a threat and assimilation on the wane and concluding that the 'great American success story may face an uncertain future ' (Huntington 2004, p. 184 ).
On a more nuanced level, there is a lively and empirically-based debate going on regarding the societal consequences of diversity. For example, some community studies in US cities correlate the degree of 178 Thomas Faist ethnic-cultural heterogeneity in certain districts with selected social indicators, finding low levels of civil-societal commitment, lower life expectancy, higher morbidity, and higher crime rates significantly correlating with high levels of ethnic and racial heterogeneity. From this perspective, 'positive' social capital, i.e. networks of trust and reciprocity, do not immediately seem to be consistent with increased ethnic-cultural diversity (Putnam 2007) . At a macro-structural level, too, econometric studies endeavour to provide evidence that around half of the variance in welfare state expenditure between the US and Europe can be attributed to the higher degree of ethnic diversity in the US (Alesina et al. 2003) . This would suggest that increased heterogeneity is a major causal factor of low measures of welfare statehood. Meanwhile, however, a growing number of enthusiasts claim that under certain circumstances cultural diversity can lead to greater innovative potential, as exemplified in the 'creative class' of young, highly qualified professionals who congregate in ethnically mixed residential districts (Florida 2005) . What is usually not highlighted is that these districts are also quite homogeneous regarding socioeconomic class positions; this time not at the lower end.
The two contradicting viewpoints both have a common flaw. They name ethnic diversity as the actual cause of the desired or lamentable situation of social cohesion, without actually examining to what extent macro-structural changes, say, on the labour market, may affect people's scope to shape their leisure and community life. One could equally plausibly assume that the acceleration of work life and especially the financial necessity of taking on two jobs have given rise to behavioural change in political and community life (Kivisto and Faist 2007, pp. 95Á101). There is thus a failure to mention how diversity is structurally embedded and how diversity develops through macro-structural transformation and the changing landscape of social inequality.
It is therefore necessary to describe and account for how organizations constitute diversity by processing ascribed characteristics, exemplified by the programmes and policies of mainstream but also migrant organizations. The key terms here are diversity management or managing diversity in the private sector, and an interculturalist approach or intercultural opening in the public sector. Diversity can be analysed from a perspective internal to national states, looking at organizations in immigrant countries. Programmes of diversity management change the decision-making structures, routines, and personnel of organizations in sustained ways (e.g. Frohnen 2005 on the Ford Motor Company). Organizations transform entities from culturally indifferent to culturally plural. Culturally plural organizations display cultural diversity as a resource, offer training programmes to increase the intercultural competence of staff, implement criteria for personnel recruitment, and offer special services to clients and customers. It is above all membership in organizations which signifies shifting boundaries between the private and the occupational realm. Culturally indifferent organizations usually respect a rather strict divide between private and occupational; markers such as ethnic heritage belong to the personal realm. Diversity programmes, by contrast, connect membership roles in organizations with knowledge and skills from the personal realm. In addition to 'ethnic' markers such as knowledge of certain languages, it is also lifestyle, cultural, or sexual preferences that serve to increase economic efficiency and productivity.
Diversity also refers to the broader question of how immigration changes the societies themselves. For example, in healthcare there is a drive towards culturally sensitive concepts such as 'transcultural psychiatry', or an increased recognition of culturally conditioned expectations of medical and nursing staff. The responses of organizations such as hospitals to this approach include not only increasing the proportion of migrant employees, and intercultural training courses for staff, but also culturally sensitive catering and nursing, rooms for religious meditation and for culturally specific death vigils, and the provision of visiting rooms to accommodate large family visits. Also, ways of communicating between nursing staff and patients turn into an issue. Means to address this aspect include, for example, multilingual signposting and labelling, multilingual educational and information material, and interpreting services. Measures reach beyond the hospital in, for example, cooperation and networking with migrant organizations and religious institutions. In some cases new staff in established organizations create their own professional organizations, as in the case of the German-Turkish Association for Psychiatry and Psychotherapy. More crucially, interculturalist issues are now discussed within interdisciplinary organizations such as the German Association for Psychiatry, Psychotherapy and Neurology (Albrecht and Borde 2007).
As already indicated by the example of multinational companies, the distinction between activities internal and external to national societies has become fluid. Over the past few years, for example, migrants have been constituted as new development agents in development cooperation by immigration and emigration countries. The fundamental idea behind this kind of transnational diversity management is that, due to their loyalties and ties as well as their local knowledge of the needs of socalled developing countries, migrants are important mediators for initiating development or conflict mediation. Financial transfers back home, the transfer of ideas Á 'social remittances' Á and knowledge, but also capabilities and competences Á the insider advantages that migrants have such as linguistic competences, social contacts, familiarity with bureaucratic processes Á are thought to benefit development cooperation. Taking recourse to the competences of migrants as development brokers and mediators with knowledge of local conditions is part of a new 'mantra' (Kapur 2004 ) of migration and development.
It is not new that Á beyond sending financial remittances Á migrants do remain in contact with those back home. This has been verified in numerous cases over the past century (Thomas and Znaniecki 1927, vol. 5) . Nonetheless, technological opportunities and multicultural sensitivities have enlarged the space for cross-border interactions. What is novel, however, is the greater incentives for civil society agents to replace the old, state-centred, development policy paradigm of the 1960s and build on the market paradigm of the 1980s and the 1990s. Programmes based on such approaches have been pushed, for example, by international organizations such as the World Bank and national states as well as development cooperation organizations. European immigration countries concentrate their development cooperation policies on countries bordering the European Union [EU] in the south and the east, such as the Joint EUÁAfrica Strategy. EU policies and public policies of member states increasingly couple development cooperation with migration control and put more emphasis on the legitimacy of national economic interests in highly qualified workers. In emigration countries, the image of migrants has changed from that of 'turncoats' to heroes. Many states Á for instance, Russia, Ghana, Mali, Mexico and the Philippines Á have meanwhile established diaspora ministries. Measures taken include tax relief for emigrants who, for example, live and work in Silicon Valley and invest in India; and symbolic-practical policies such as the tolerance of dual citizenship help to uphold the loyalty of emigrants (Faist 2008) .
The deployment of migrants as development agents can be observed on two levels, on both of which there are increased endeavours by international organizations, states and non-governmental organizations [NGOs] to create incentives for migrants to become involved in promoting development. On one level, diasporic migrants return as highly qualified workers for brief assignments to their countries of origin, or develop small-scale projects on their own initiative Á for example medical doctors in the health sector. On a second level, it is individual migrants and migrant collectives, from families to migrant self-organizations, who not only support relatives and friends in their country of origin but also become involved in activities such as building wells or schools. In some European countries there are now state programmes that combine the periodic return of migrants and their involvement with development cooperation. It should be noted, however, that such programmes Á the co-développement scheme in France for instance Á were originally created to encourage the return of migrants to their home countries, and are built on close and politically asymmetric ties from colonial times. Today, such schemes go further and combine incorporation, development, and migration control policies by supporting local projects run by migrants.
In the light of these new policy measures for promoting migrants as development agents and brokers, certain attributes of migrants that were hitherto regarded as drawbacks Á 'fence sitting', for example Á are reinterpreted as mobility competences and thus selling points. In short, cross-border ties and associated resources Á that is, the very transnationality of migrants Á become a characteristic of diversity. This characteristic refers to, for instance, commitments in migrants' regions of origin, which were formerly seen as an indicator for nonintegration in immigration states. Incorporation in the country of immigration, from the perspective of such policies, is by all means compatible with transnational involvement and commitments in the country of origin. Empirical studies show that incorporation in the country of immigration is virtually a prerequisite for meaningful involvement in development policy activities. Transnational activists as a rule still have their local roots in their regions of origin and use them as a basis for transboundary involvement. This is testified by the activities of African organizations in Germany that are involved in development cooperation and help with the building of schools or water supply, for example (Sieveking, Fauser and Faist 2008) . Research findings from the US also show that, as a rule, immigrants from Colombia, Mexico and the Dominican Republic active in development politics have a good knowledge of the language, a high professional status, and numerous social contacts in the country of immigration (Portes, Escobar and Radford 2007) .
It is interesting to observe the problems associated with transnationality as a diversity characteristic on the organizational level. Empirical findings on Salvadorian migrant organizations in southern California indicate that, first, internal conflicts in immigrant groups rarely allow effective transnational work, and, second, development objectives and interests are sometimes subject to dispute between migrants and those who remained behind (Waldinger, Popkin and Magana 2008) . This suggests that the problems encountered in cooperation with migrant organizations are in principle no different from the problems that emerge between established development aid organizations and the addressees of cooperation. This evidence underscores the limits to diversity as a paradigm for overcoming structural problems of development cooperation.
Transnationality as diversity
In terms of countries of origin, languages, religions, legal status, and political management, it cannot be expected that cultural diversity as 182 Thomas Faist an important organizational and societal feature is likely to decline in the near future. Two epochal developments especially point to this: in addition to multicultural sensitivities, these are the transnationalization of migration and its consequences, and the universalization of legal claims at the national and international level over the past decades. In turn, the transnationalization of social life worlds and the universalization of rights have resulted in transnationality as a new form of diversity Á adding and interacting with known forms such as gender, religion, language and social class.
Transnationalization of social life worlds
What we are observing is a gradual breakdown of the integrative Weberian 'cage' for migrants both in the urban or regional centres and on a transnational level. Cross-border transactions thus imply an increased trans-border integration of social practices (transnationalization), and cross-border elements of common horizons of meaning and senses of belonging or common identifications (transnationality). Many migrants maintain ties to their countries of origin, or links to other regions, after settling in immigration countries. A variety of close, continual ties arises within families in the case of chain migration, in religious communities, in ethnic diasporas, via (migrants') human rights organizations, and through academic or business cliques. In Germany, for example, a significant minority of immigrants correspond to the type of multicultural-transnational integration, being socio-economically successful but not assimilating culturally (between approximately 10 and 15 per cent; see Fincke 2008).
Such cases are known as transnational social spaces, whereby at some point not geographical mobility but rather the continued contacts between migrants and relatively immobile correspondents across borders are decisive. Of course, such transnational ties are nothing new and have existed for a long time. In the age of nationalism Max Weber used the term 'communities abroad' (Weber 1980, p. 234) , thereby referring to groups and associations of German migrants in North and South America during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The technological possibilities of communication have burgeoned since then, and discourses on diffusion mechanisms have not only transnationalized but even universalized.
Concomitantly, the metaphors used to describe migrant incorporation have changed. Notions of the assimilation of migrants found their analogy in the image of uprooted migrants, as in the analysis of European immigrants to the US in the nineteenth century in The Uprooted by historian Oscar Handlin (2002) . Much later, from a transnational perspective, the emphasis lay on translation, excellently Diversity Á a new mode of incorporation? 183 described in the novel Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie (1997) . This is pointing to the contribution of migrants and minorities to national literary canons. For instance, what could be called German-Turkish or French-Moroccan literature is nowadays looked upon not simply as hybrid but as a contribution towards the regeneration of the respective national literatures. Such literature has meanwhile internalized an ethnographic perspective and reconstructs migration histories through reminiscence and recalcitrance. Once certain patterns formerly only attributed to specific, migration-related elements or to minority cultures enter mainstream canons, they are taken for granted as part of a wider repertoire (Ezli 2006) . Examples include the work of German-Turkish authors such as Feridun Zaimoglu (Leyla) and film directors Fatih Akin (Auf der anderen Seite/The Edge of Heaven) and Abdellatif Kechiche (La graine et le mulet). These trends reinforce transnationality as a diversity characteristic in national cultural canons.
Universalization of legal rights
Parallel to the transnationalization of social worlds and transnationality as diversity, the significance of human rights conventions in liberal democracies is growing and impacting on the incorporation of migrants. The development of minority regimes can be observed, for example, in the context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] , and through the Council of Europe. It is about the universalization of quasi-rights, the demand that governments protect and promote cultural diversity.
Dual citizenship as an institutionalized form of transnational membership is a prime example of this kind of universalization . A few decades ago, dual nationality was not tolerated by any state at all, but today over half of all states worldwide tolerate multiple citizenship in some way. Reasons for the lack of tolerance were fears for the loyalty of those with dual nationality in the case of conflicts (e.g. a war between the two states in question); potential disadvantages for individuals (e.g. military service); and concern about integration in the host country for which the elimination of ties to the country of origin was deemed crucial if it was to succeed. By contrast, the new course which has been adopted in recent decades does not insist on 'political monogamy', as it were, or loyalty to one state only, but takes multiple ties into account. Even in states where as a rule multiple citizenship for migrants is not provided for Á for instance in Germany, Austria, and Iceland Á the number of migrants undergoing naturalization while preserving their original nationality is continually on the rise.
The central point of departure for the greater tolerance of dual citizenship was international law, especially in relation to categories such as women or stateless persons. Gender equality made its way into international law, for example, through the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women of 1957, and later into the legislation of national states. Women no longer have to relinquish their own nationality if they marry a man with a different nationality. Going one step further, this means that children of binational marriages automatically receive dual citizenship. This principle was codified in the European Convention on Nationality of 1993, which reformed the much stricter Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and on Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality of 1963. In all European states, the toleration of dual citizenship has meanwhile become the rule for children from binational marriages and for marriage partners.
The universalization of rights and its impact on transnationality as a diversity characteristic result not so much from the recognition of transnational ties as such, but from the elimination of sexual discrimination and from the right to nationality that were, and still are, of significance. On the part of migrants and their significant others transnationality is in itself a strategy of survival and betterment. In emigration countries, on the other hand, dual citizenship functions as one of a number of instruments used to uphold or win back the loyalty of their citizens (Faist and Kivisto 2007) .
Outlook: bringing in social inequality and civil society
The exploration of ways towards incorporation in and through diversity will prove to be a central challenge of the twenty-first century in dealing with the tension between expectations of homogeneity or heterogeneity and demands for social equality. The emphasis on diversity signals a turning point and a move away from the rather more sceptical evaluations of diversity in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. At that time, prevalent social and political theory took a sceptical stance towards the relation between diversity on the one hand and equality and democracy on the other hand. John Stuart Mill, for instance, can be seen as a classic proponent of the sceptical standpoint (Mill 2006; see also Weber 1988) . Not until the late 1980s did reasoning in favour of the compatibility of liberal universal ideas and cultural difference gain hold in Will Kymlicka's (1995) concept of multicultural citizenship. The turn to diversity is a further continuation, this time in organizations and civil society.
Concepts of diversity zero in on organizational adaptation to cultural pluralism and the utilization of individual competences in order to facilitate either full inclusion in civil society Á keywords are Diversity Á a new mode of incorporation? 185 terms such as intercultural opening of public administration Á or competition in markets Á characterized by concepts such as diversity management. These various discourses of diversity have raised challenges for social inequality and democracy, known already by debates on multiculturalism. Organizations use and thus constitute markers such as ethnicity, religion, gender, and class in order to 'mainstream' their structures and routines. Such characteristics may signal social inequality and uneven distribution of power between groups made up or split along ethnic, gender, class, or religious lines. Through applying diversity programmes, inequality along such lines may be reified, or newly created and legitimized. For example, managing diversity programmes run the danger of reinforcing categories such as ethnicity (Wrench 2005) . Thus the risk is high that cultural differences are perpetuated by diversity programmes, while racial or ethnic inequality in access to positions and within organizations is regarded as a problem to be addressed by management techniques. The danger involved thus would be that cultural difference is separated from issues such as social inequality by compartmentalizing it as managing individual competence for organizational efficiency. In essence, future research needs to heed the conclusion arrived at in empirical analyses of fields such as labour markets, that 'far too little attention has been paid to the relationship between diversity and inequality and to the contextual importance of intergroup relations in the larger society' (DiTomaso, Post and ParksYancy 2007, p. 474).
Ultimately, diversity programmes in organizations which mainly focus on the management of diversity tend to occlude not only the genesis and reproduction of social inequalities but also public contention and thus the struggle for equal rights. Struggles around both recognition and redistribution constitute a mode of democratic incorporation and citizenship practices. This applies equally to cultural, political, and social rights. To avoid disconnecting diversity programmes from actual political developments and societal practices, the diversity paradigm needs to be connected to democratic contention. This means that diversity has to be linked with actually voiced demands for equal chances of participation in order to understand the problems connected with social inequality (Faist 2010) . It is a central feature of all democratic societies that political processes are shaped by demands for material and symbolic equality (de Tocqueville 1988) .
Thus, if the current discussion on diversity is to go beyond the narrow emphasis on organizational change and the efficient use of individual competence, based on increasing significance of diversity as a set of personal characteristics and policies, the insights gained from sociological research on multiculturalism need to be heeded and further developed. At least from the perspective of decision-makers and most of the political advocates of multiculturalism, the other objective of multicultural and thus also diversity policies is to bring heretofore-marginalized groups into the political sphere and the societal mainstream. As is evidenced in actual practices of multiculturalists, there is constant reference to a civil-society discourse. In other words, multiculturalism in a democracy constitutes a mode of incorporation that is characterized by a particular type of civil participation. This type of engagement is part of what Alexander (2006) calls the 'civil sphere'. The focus of the civil sphere is the political realm, which is prior to the official relations between states and citizens and rests primarily on the resources of the citizens themselves. Diversity thus adds another layer in bringing in not only 'rights' but also the civil sphere. Central resources of the civil sphere are solidarity and trust without which democracy cannot be conceived. This insight is particularly relevant for the debates on diversity because, at first sight, it seems that the organizational level on which diversity programmes are conceptualized and implemented is a realm outside the civil sphere and thus democratic deliberation. However, there is a nexus: it is only in this organizational and associational realm that the civil sphere can effectively take hold.
The extension of multiculturalism to diversity also points toward a new relationship between the universal and the particular. In a multicultural society 'incorporation is not celebrated as inclusion, but as the achievement of diversity' (Alexander 2006, p. 452) . This then makes possible a politics of difference in place of the previous goal of a unified and homogeneous core. From this perspective the politics of diversity is thus also a politics of multiculturalism, albeit with new facets in bringing in more fully the neglected organizational realm comprising both private companies and public administration. In the end, the discussion on diversity is a clear sign that the claim that multiculturalism is on the wane is not borne out. Multiculturalism as a mode of civic incorporation is likely to become more important in the future. The new discussions on diversity also indicate that multiculturalism extends beyond the borders of national states, regarding both norms-making in the international realm and the life world of migrants and relatively immobile persons in the transnational realm.
